positive research tradition exists that evaluates many as~cts of the evolution of new products.2 But despite this long tradition, little research has focused on the role that new products play in the valuation of firms in the marketplace. Much of this neglect is rooted in the lack of integration between marketing and finance and hence the somewhat different research traditions. It has also been taken for granted that new product innovations are necessary because of com~titive pressures and are therefore per se valuable. The actual level of their value ap~ared to be of little importance. This article attempts to fill this gap by using traditional event-study methodology to study the impact of new product introductions on the market value of a large sample of firms over a to-year horizon.
The Role and Value of Innovation
Innovative behavior is believed to be the engine of economic growth and development; this belief accounts for the extensive debate, which has raged for decades, centering on the understanding and fostering of that behavior. Economic analysis has focused primarily on three aspects of the role of innovation. First, does a competitive marketplace allocate resources to invention efficiently? The majority opinion appears to indicate that it does not-or that it only does so under very restrictive circumstances (see, e.g., Arrow 1962) . The public-good nature of much inventive activity simply does not allow firms to recover the sunk costs of pothesis, that monopoly is necessary for the fostering of innovation (Schumpeter 1934) . Following the prior two research traditions, a third stream of research has arisen that examines the role that the government can play in fostering innovation. This last stream focuses on the (see, e.g., Machlup 1958) .3 I. For a textual overview. see Hisrich and Peters (1978) or Urban and Hauser (1980) . For a more research oriented review. see Wind, Mahajan. and Cardozo (1981) and Shocker and Hall (1986) .
2. See. e.g.. Bass (1969) , Moore and Lehmann (1982) , Horsky and Simon (1983) .
3. For a detailed discussion of all three areas of research, see Kamien and Schwartz (1975). Standard economic analyses have shown a consistent positive relationship between expenditures on research and development (R & D) and patenting behavior and subsequent profitability. Mansfield (1968) however, firms typically cannot recover these returns in competition.
That the development of new product innovations is essential to the continued existence of firms is also supported by several approaches to developing a business strategy. The well-known growth-share matrix, popularized by the Boston Consulting Group in the 1970s, postulated that it balanced portfolio of products-some relatively mature to provide a stable current cash flow and some new to generate cash flow in the future-is needed for the long-term profitability of the firm. The theory of the product life cycle, with its stages of growth, maturity, and d~cline, indicates that a natural process exists that requires the firm to take active steps to assure that its product line does not become obsolete. Firms keep their product offerings up to date by either expanding the product offerings, redesigning existing products, or "harvesting" existing products to provide the funds to e-xpand into new lines of business (Urban and Hauser 1980) .
Along with the necessity of developing new products is the concomitant risk associated with the innovation process. Many cases can be documented of new product failures that cost the sponsoring companies significant amounts of money (e.g., Polaroid's Polavision). Studies by Booz, Allen and Hamilton (1971, 1980) tory. Moreover, the risk of failure understates the actual risk associated with innovations. Innovators must face the fact that other firms will imitate their actions, typically earning a share of the profits that is greater than their initial investment.
Rationale for the Present Research
The current research applies the well-accepted event-study methodology of finance to marketing decisions. Such an integration is important for three reasons. First, although many marketing and strategic management studies attempt to evaluate specific strategic decisions, few have attempted to link their evaluative criteria to the most common measure of firm valuation, the stock price (a notable exception is Horsky and Swyngedouw 's [1987] study of the signal value of corporate name changes). Second, innovative behavior has been argued by many to be the driving force behind managerial and corporate success, yet little evidence exists that relates such behavior to the firm's market value. Mansfield (1968) and others (e.g., Mansfield et aI. 1971 Mansfield et aI. , 1977 and Scherer 1977) have examined the impact of innovations and patents on profitability and market structure; yet Pakes's (1985) The remainder of the article will be organized as follows. The next As with any corporate endeavor, information is flowing to the financial markets continuously, thus incorporating the value of the information into the finn's stock price. Because of this flow of information, the evaluation of the market value of a specific endeavor is made difficult since much of the information is amorphous, making it impossible to determine exactly when the information is "actually" released. that infonnation. What is occurring when the public announcement is made is not a full evaluation of the product's market value but the fonning of a consensus of opinion about the value of the product and its likelihood of success. Therefore, the final empirical evaluation of the new product represents only a portion, and at times a very small portion, of the actual value of the product. 
Hypotheses
In general, the marketing and strategic planning literature treat new product introductions as necessary activities for finns. Books in the new product area (e.g., Urban and Hauser 1980; Crawford 1987) However, on closer inspection, there is much to be said for firms that cleverly manage their existing products. Through innovations in packaging, promotion, and distribution, and by making minor modifications in products to better suit customer tastes, existing products can prove to be highly profitable. For example, a recent study by Hambrick and Macmillan (1982) showed that products categorized either as "cash cows" (high-share products in low-growth markets) or "dogs" by the Boston Consulting Group portfolio model (low-share products in low-growth markets) actually outperformed "problem children.' (low-share products in high-growth markets), generally newer Porter (1980) , and the empirical results of the PIMS project (Buzzell and Gale 1987) 
Methodology
The Logic of Event-Study Methodology Event-study methodology is a natural outgrowth of the rational expectations/efficient markets tradition in financial economics. In an effi-cient market, security prices reflect aU available information about the firm, and any new information received by the market is instantaneously incorporated into the stock price. In such a market, a change in security prices is an unbiased reflection of changes in the expected the methodology has been used in marketing-related contexts, these isolated examples have traditionally been conducted by economists. Peltzman (1981) found that there are large and significant stock market reactions to unfair and deceptive advertising complaints issued -yearperiod (1979 and 1980) . As we will show, there are significant differences in the magnitude of the impact of new products by industry and year. In addition, they failed to relate their results to either the characteristics of the firms introducing the products or the products themselves. Both of these problems are resolved in the present study.
A General Description of the Methodology6
Unanticipated firm-specific events that have cash flow implications for the firm will be revealed by the unexpected return to the firm's shareholders sometime over the period when the unanticipated events become fully realized. The unexpected stock-price return is computed as the difference between the realized stock-price return on day t and the expected stock-price return on day t, or !Lit = Ri, -E{RitIO,-I}' Warner (1980.1985) for a description of the appropriate statistical tests.
7. The usage of the event window rather than the actual event date itself allows the investigator to analyze any preannouncement information effects that are occurring. 
General Limitations of Event Studies
There are several limitations to event studies. First, stock prices are naturally noisy, implying that an event must trigger a reaction that is significant enough to be seen above the normal background noise. Second, most events have no true event date. That is, although a public announcement may exist, it is next to impossible to find out precisely when information has been incorporated into the stock price; hence there is a tendency to see abnormal returns prior to public announcements. Third, many events have a tendency to cluster. For example, firms use stockholders' meetings to announce earnings and major changes. Also, managers have the incentive to attempt to counter bad information, such as low quarterly earnings, with potentially good information, for example, the signing of a government contract or other corporate developments. Fourth, many events do not Third, new contracts of a nonunique nature were excluded. It was felt that receiving new customers, even for a customized product, did not represent a new product. This latter restriction applied almost exclusively to government contracts. It is not felt that these restrictions Table 1 shows that four industries dominate the product introduction sample: computers (27.89%), chemicals and pharmaceuticals (17.88%), photographic equipment (14.91%), and electrical equipment and appliances (12.98%). Interestingly, the dominance by these industries is somewhat attenuated when the number of distinct firms introducing products over the years is considered. This follows because these four industries also have four of the five largest average number of product announcements made over the period; 5.95 announcements in 10 years for the firms in the sample versus 2.01 announcements in 10 years for all other firms for which standard industrial classification (SIC) codes are available. Table 2 presents the number of announcements by year along with information for comparison on the growth in gross national product announcements, is not argued to be representative of all new products. This fact can be noted when we discuss the industries represented in the sample. Therefore, our results cannot be argued to necessarily hold true for the universe of all new products. However, given that the Wall Street Journars reporting bias is to report on those things its editors feel are of value to investors, our sample could be described as a sample of "significant" inconsistent results about the profitability of the firms in our sample versus the matched sample, leading one to conclude that there is little current profitability difference between the two. However, when the price learnings (PIE) ratio is examined it is found that the matched sample's average PIE ratio is about one-half of that of the product announcement sample. The implication appears to be that the market is valuing the long-term stream of earnings generated by these firms at a much higher rate than their industry peers. These results provide direct support for hypothesis 1. The market-based measure of performance, the PIE ratio, reflects the performance of the innovating fiirns in the sample in contrast to the matched sample of noninnovating firms.
Empirical Methodology
In our study, the event date examined is the date that the new product ( 1 day before to 1 day after the announcement (-1, + 1),3 days before to 3 days after the announcement (-3, + 3), 5 days before to 1 day after the announcement (-5, + 1), and 5 days before to 5 days after the announcement (-5, + 5). These time periods are examined because information about the new product may have leaked out prior to the formal announcement. However, it is felt that much of the information about new products will be incorporated into the stock price quickly;
hence we chose to use slightly smaller event windows than many other investigators have used.
To develop a returns forecasting model, the market model was estimated for each firm using a period of 600 days prior to the event date up to the beginning of the event window (5, 3, or 1 day[sJ). Since the events were spread out over a 10-year period, there was no clustering of events around the same date, thereby alleviating the necessity of estimating these models simultaneously so as to avoid covariance between their errors..
The trading strategy implied by this analysis is that at the beginning of the event period, an equal amount is invested in each of the 1,101 securities. Warner (1980, 1985) for a complete description of the statistical tests. represents a component of the cost of capital; the higher the beta, the shorter the life of the capital. Hence, new products are a necessity of the firms with the higher betas. Higher-beta firms need to introduce new products or update existing products more frequently. The implications of this fact are further confused by the finding that, within our sample, there is a negative relationship between the number of products introduced over the 10-year period and beta (correlation = -0.183). In other words, although the sample of firms introducing new products has a larger risk profile than the market, the relation between risk and new product introductions is seen to reverse when the number of introductions is considered. Why might this be the case? If the firms in our sample are the least diversified firms in the largest industries, then it is conceivable that the negative beta within-sample effect is due to the lack of diversification between the high innovators and low innovators in the total innovator sample.11 leakage is potentially a large problem, some unanticipated effect of the announcement can be seen. In addition, these results are consistent with, although naturally the opposite in sign from, the effects of automobile product recalls found by Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) . In their study, an automobile recall led to an approximate -0.81% 3-day excess return. Table   6   replicates   table   4 with industry breakdowns. We see once again that the shortest window provides the strongest evidence of an effect, with all other windows insignificant. The industries exhibiting the strongest significant excess returns are food, printing, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, computers, photographic equipment, and durable and nondurable goods. Several industries show a large absolute magnitude of effect: securities and real estate, motion pictures, and mining and construction. However, the standard errors of these esti- For a product to be considered an update, the announcement had to explicitly specify that it was an update or an enhancement of an existing product. In the case of multiple-product announcements, only the primary product announced was coded as to whether or not it was an update.12 Overall, multiple-product announcements have a significantly stronger impact on excess stock returns than single product announcements. Single-product announcements have a 3-day excess return of 0.61% (three times the CARL-I, + 1] of 0.20%), while multipleproduct announcements have a 3-day excess return of 0.93% (three times the CAR[-I, +1] of 0.31%).
Industry Results
Original-product announcements also fare better than product update announcements, a 0.74% 3-day excess return versus a 0.41% 3-day excess return. When these results are broken down in more detail, it is seen that multiple-product original 12 . Product announcements were also subjectively evaluated as to their innovativeness, that is, whether they were truly new-to-the-world innovations, copies of existing products of other producers (me-too products), or simple improvements of an existing product of the firm. These qualitative rankings were not found to impact on any of the results and were less valuable than the more objective UPDATE variable.
announcements have the largest impact, a 0.95% 3-day excess return, with single-product updates showing the smallest impact, a 0.35% 3-day excess return. It should be noted that multiple-product announcements generate less than twice the effect of a single-product announcement. In terms of dollar market value, we see the same basic The number of products negatively influences the excess return, indicating that there is marginally more "surprise" value associated with the introductions made by firms which introduce fewer products.
The impact of MULTIPLE and UPDATE are consistent with the ex- Overall, the results appear to indicate that little predictive value exists in using past and current accounting figures to predict the magni- The major impact appears to accrue to firms with a small number of original new product announcements. Some predictive value for the magnitude of the excess returns is found by simply examining short-term interest rates.
Market value of excess returns regression. Table 10 Larger industries have a larger magnitude of effect, driven by the fact that they have the largest dollar value of equity outstanding. Yet, the largest effect is seen to reside in the smallest firms in each industry. The aggregate impact of the announcement of a new product was approximately 0.75% over a 3-day period. This effect was also found to vary marginally from industry to industry. It must be emphasized once again that this estimate does not reflect the total value of the product to the firm but is more a measure of the formation of a consensus of Wm. Wrigley Co. introduces Orbit. a gum using the sweetener xylitol (August 26).
1977:
Abbott Labs receives approval for Hydron burn bandage (January 24).
Anheuser-Busch introduces Natural Light beer (May 19).
Caterpillar introduces the DIG crawler-tractor (September 14). 
